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Most of the plutonium in the world resides inside spent nuclear reactor fuel rods. This high-
level radioactive waste is commonly held in long-term storage within large, heavily shielded casks.
Currently, international nuclear safeguards inspectors have no stand-alone method of verifying the
amount of reactor fuel stored within a sealed cask. Here we demonstrate experimentally that
measurements of the scattering angles of cosmic ray muons which pass through a storage cask can
be used to determine if spent fuel assemblies are missing without opening the cask. This application
of technology and methods commonly used in high-energy particle physics provides a potential
solution to this long-standing problem in international nuclear safeguards.
I. INTRODUCTION
Plutonium is produced in all uranium-fueled nuclear
reactors following neutron capture on 238U nuclei and
two beta decays, primarily through the reactions
238U+ n−−→239U β
−
−−−→239Np β
−
−−−→239Pu. (1)
As reactor fuel ages, the concentration of fission prod-
ucts in the fuel grows, reducing the reactor’s neutron
flux and overall efficiency. Typically, when spent fuel is
removed from power reactors, ∼ 1% of the initial 238U
nuclei have been converted to various plutonium isotopes,
with relative concentrations that depend on the total
neutron flux the fuel has been exposed to and the age
of the fuel. After removal from the reactor core, the
plutonium can be recovered and purified by chemical re-
processing of the spent fuel. It can then be used in ra-
dioisotope thermoelectric generators [1, 2], recycled for
further use as reactor fuel [3], or used as fissile material
in nuclear explosives.
Most nations in the world are signatories to the Treaty
on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) [4].
The NPT has three key pillars, which specify treaty
member’s requirements regarding nonproliferation, the
peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and disarmament. In
relation to nonproliferation, the nuclear-weapon states1
pledge not to directly or indirectly facilitate the trans-
fer of nuclear weapons to non-weapon states, or to facil-
itate their acquisition or control of such weapons. The
non-weapon states pledge not to receive, manufacture, or
otherwise acquire nuclear weapons. In this context, the
∗ Corresponding author: durham@lanl.gov
1 defined in the NPT as nations which manufactured and deto-
nated a nuclear explosive device prior to 1 January 1967: China,
France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States
non-weapon states agree to accept safeguards by the In-
ternational Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which shall
be applied on all fissionable material within the state or
under its control for the purpose of verifying compliance
with the treaty. The IAEA considers member state decla-
rations, analyzes open-source data and information from
third parties, and conducts inspections of nuclear facili-
ties to draw conclusions about activities in states under
nuclear safeguards.
Inspectors have an array of technologies at their dis-
posal to examine materials at various stages of the nu-
clear fuel cycle [5, 6]. Many sites which are under safe-
guards have cameras, allowing inspectors to remotely
monitor reactor fuel loading and unloading, and portal
monitors on facility exits which can detect spent fuel as-
semblies being moved out of the reactor building [7, 8].
Following removal from the reactor core, spent fuel usu-
ally goes directly into a cooling pool, where it sits for
several years as short-lived fission products decay. Here
inspectors can verify the presence and number of fuel
rods by observing Cherenkov radiation produced in the
water by electrons which have Compton scattered from
decay photons produced by fission products [9], or with
neutron and gamma ray measurements [10].
After removal from the pool, spent fuel is typically
placed in long-term storage within large, heavily shielded
containers called dry storage casks [11]. A typical cask
for fuel from pressurized light-water reactors is a right
circular cylinder of diameter ∼3 m and height ∼5 m, and
consists of a central basket which holds 20-30 spent fuel
assemblies, surrounded by cylindrical layers of neutron
and gamma-ray shielding. IAEA inspectors maintain ac-
countability of the cask contents by applying tamper-
indicating seals to the lids of the casks, which are checked
during periodic inspections.
Once filled, casks are typically stored outdoors at re-
actors or dedicated storage facilities. At these sites, the
cask seals are exposed to the elements, where they may
corrode, or can be damaged during cask handling. If a
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2seal fails, accountability of the fuel in the cask is lost; to
reassert the IAEA’s knowledge of its contents the cask
must be returned to a spent fuel pool where it can be
safely opened and re-verified. The long procedure for
transporting and opening the cask is costly, as well as
disruptive to operations at the nuclear facility under in-
spection. Therefore, an in situ means for determining
if the cask’s contents are intact is a necessary tool for
safeguards inspectors [12, 13].
Conventional active radiography with neutrons or pho-
tons is not feasible due to the heavy shielding that is used
to contain the radiation emitted by the fuel, as well as
self-shielding from the fuel assemblies themselves, which
can total over 100 radiation lengths for typical casks [14].
Previous work showed that measurements of radiation
which escapes the cask are capable of proving that the
cask has radioactive contents, but the scattered radiation
which emerges does not carry sufficient radiographic in-
formation to determine if individual assemblies are miss-
ing [15]. Alternative methods of measuring a cask’s radi-
ation “fingerprint” for subsequent re-verification at later
dates [16, 17] must correct for decays of fission prod-
ucts in the fuel, and for large variations in background
between the initial measurement at the reactor site and
later measurements at a spent fuel storage installation.
Since this requires pre-existing measurements of a cask’s
condition, as well as information on fuel burnup from the
facility operator, it is not an independent, stand-alone
method for re-verification of existing casks. Antineu-
trino monitoring has also been studied as a method for
detection of missing fuel [18], however this requires detec-
tors with active masses on the order of ∼10 tons, which
presents a deployment challenge, and requires counting
time on the order of ∼1 year. There are many sites in
Europe and Asia where spent fuel is monitored under
safeguards, but this current inability to determine the
content of dry storage casks also presents a potential
challenge to full implementation of the Joint Compre-
hensive Plan of Action (JCPOA) [19], an international
agreement which includes requirements that Iran remove
all spent reactor fuel from the country. The highly ra-
dioactive spent fuel from the Arak heavy-water reactor
must be stored and shipped in heavily shielded contain-
ers, which may potentially require verification prior to
shipment.
There has been much work in simulation and on lab-
oratory test objects to show that highly penetrating
cosmic-ray muons are potentially useful for interrogat-
ing encapsulated nuclear waste [14, 20–32]. A previous
measurement by our group showed that muon scattering
is sensitive to the fuel content of a cask, but that data set
only covered a small portion of a cask and had limited
discriminatory power [33]. Here, we show experimentally
that muon scattering radiography is sensitive to the re-
moval of multiple fuel bundles from a dry storage cask
with high confidence (> 5σ), and demonstrate a poten-
tial sensitivity to the removal of a single bundle at the
2.3σ level in a statistics-limited measurement. This po-
tentially represents a new method for inspectors to verify
the content of a dry storage cask, and can thereby solve
a long-standing problem in nuclear safeguards.
II. METHOD
Highly energetic nuclei produced in astrophysical pro-
cesses are continually interacting in the upper atmo-
sphere, producing showers containing secondary charged
mesons that subsequently decay to muons. These cosmic
ray muons arrive on the surface of the Earth at a rate of
∼ 104/m2/min with a broad energy distribution that has
a mean of ∼4 GeV (see [34] for a review). The muon flux
is roughly proportional to cos2θz, where θz is the angle
from the zenith. Muons are the most abundant charged
particle found at the Earth’s surface.
The unique properties of muons enable them to pene-
trate large, dense objects and provide radiographic infor-
mation on the object’s internal structure, through mea-
surements of muon attenuation [35–38], scattering [39–
41], and associated secondary particle production [42].
Since muons are charged leptons, they do not lose energy
through hadronic interactions, but only experience elec-
tromagnetic energy loss and multiple Coulomb scatter-
ing as they pass through material. The muon’s relatively
large mass of 105 MeV/c2 suppresses radiative energy
loss from emission of bremsstrahlung photons, and cos-
mic ray muons relevant for imaging fall in the momentum
range where energy loss per unit areal density is near the
Bethe-Bloch minimum of − < dE/dx >≈ 1 MeV/g/cm2.
The scattering angles relativistic muons undergo when
passing through matter are dependent on the radiation
length X0 of the material encountered, and can be de-
scribed by a Gaussian with a width approximated by
σ =
13.6MeV
βcp
√
L/X0, (2)
where βc and p are the muon’s velocity and momen-
tum, and L/X0 is the number of radiation lengths the
muon passes through [34]. Since X0 decreases rapidly
with increasing atomic number Z, muon scattering is es-
pecially sensitive to the presence of dense, high-Z ma-
terials. These properties allow muons to penetrate low-
Z shielding (a cask’s steel or concrete body), interact
with high-Z material (uranium fuel) and exit the shield-
ing carrying radiographic information about the internal
structure.
In 2016, two muon tracking detectors were placed
around a Westinghouse MC-10 cask at Idaho National
Laboratory (see Fig. 1) [43]. The MC-10 cask has an ex-
ternal diameter of 2.7 m and a height of 4.8 m. Inside the
steel skin of the cask is a cylindrical layer of BISCO NS-3
neutron shielding and a 25 cm thick layer of steel gamma
shielding, which surrounds the fuel basket. The basket
itself has slots for 24 PWR fuel assemblies, and is made
of aluminum with borated plates to control criticality.
3FIG. 1: The two muon trackers around the MC-10 cask.
One tracker is elevated by 1.2 m relative to the other to
sample the muon flux at smaller zenith angles. Both are
housed inside weatherproof containers. One of the
lifting trunnions that is used as a reference point to
align the detectors with the fuel basket is visible on the
bottom left of the cask body.
The fuel assemblies inside the cask are standard West-
inghouse 15×15 rod bundles that were removed from a
power reactor in the 1980s. Each assembly is 21×21 cm2
in cross section and 4 m in height, with a burnup in the
range of 3×104 MWday. This particular cask was chosen
as a test object because it is only partially loaded, with
18 out of 24 possible fuel positions filled. A diagram of
the cask loading is shown in Fig. 2. Lifting trunnions on
the outside of the cask serve as a fiducial reference point
for alignment of the muon detectors with the fuel basket.
Two identical muon tracking detectors were placed
on opposite sides of the cask to measure the trajecto-
ries of muons before and after passing through the cask,
with one detector elevated relative to the other by 1.2
m in order to sample the higher muon flux at smaller
θz. Each tracker consists of six double-layers of 24 alu-
minum drift tubes, which are a typical technology used
for tracking cosmic-ray muons [44] and muons produced
at collider experiments [45–47] . The tubes each have
an aluminum wall with thickness of 0.89 mm and are
5 cm in diameter and 1.2 m in length, and are filled
with a 47.5/42.5/7.5/2.5 mixture of Ar/CF4/C2H6/He
at 1 bar and permanently sealed. Muons passing through
the tubes ionize the gas, and the ionization is amplified
through a gas avalanche process and collected on 30 µm
gold-plated tungsten wires held at 2.6 kV which run down
the center of each tube. Fits to the patterns of hits in the
tubes give muon trajectories. A comparison of the ingo-
ing and outgoing trajectories gives the scattering angle
the muon underwent while passing through the cask. A
drawing of one double-layer and a complete muon track-
ing detector is shown in Fig. 3.
FIG. 2: A diagram showing the cask loading
configuration and the detector positions during the
measurements as viewed from above. Muons moving
between the two detectors pass through columns in the
fuel basket containing (from left to right) zero, one, six,
five, four, and two fuel assemblies. Data was recorded
with the detector on the lower right, but winds at the
testing site shook the detector during this portion of the
measurement, rendering the data unusable for analysis.
Despite the heavy shielding, there is still a radiation
dose rate of ∼10 mrem/hr from neutrons and an addi-
tional ∼10 mrem/hr from gamma rays at the cask’s outer
surface, where the muon trackers are positioned. Comp-
ton scattered electrons or protons from neutron scatter-
ing can produce hits in single tubes, which will degrade
muon tracking performance if they are included in the
track fitting algorithm. To reduce this background, a
trigger was introduced which requires hits in neighbor-
ing tubes within a time window of 600 ns in order for
those hits to be considered in the tracking. Given the
maximum drift time of ∼ 1µs and the fact that 6.8% of
the drift tubes are non functional, this coincidence re-
quirement reduces overall tracking efficiency by ∼50%,
but does allow muons to be tracked in this radiation en-
vironment.
Since the size of the detectors is small relative to the
size of the cask, both the upper and lower detectors were
placed at 3 different horizontal positions (for a total of 9
measurement configurations) in order to record scatter-
ing data across the entire cask. At each position, a rough
alignment of the detectors was performed using measure-
ments taken by hand around the cask. A fine alignment
was later performed in software using the muon tracks
themselves, with techniques that are commonly used to
align charged particle tracking detectors at accelerator-
based experiments. Since there is no preferred direction
4FIG. 3: a) One of the horizontal double-layers of drift
tubes, which gives a position where the muon crossed
the detector along the vertical direction, but provides
no information on the horizontal position where there is
no segmentation. In the complete muon tracker (b), an
identical double-layer that is oriented with tube
segmentation along the horizontal direction is placed
behind this one. This pattern repeats three times to
give a total of six double-layers (three horizontal and
three vertical) in each detector. The blue and red boxes
contain low and high voltage supplies.
for scattering of cosmic ray muons, the scattering angle
in the plane perpendicular to the muons direction is zero
when averaged over an ensemble of muon tracks. Using
the measured incoming and outgoing muon track vectors,
an optimal rotation matrix to align the two directional
vector sets was constructed using a least squares method
described in [48]. This rotation matrix was then applied
to all of the muon tracks in a single data set. An optimal
detector translation was then found by constructing the
residual value
S2 ≡
m∑
j=1
[( ~V1j + ~O − ~P21j)T ( ~V1j + ~O − ~P21j)
+( ~V2j − ~P12j)T ( ~V2j − ~P12j)]
(3)
where ~Vi is the position of a muon track in the i de-
tector and ~Pik is the projection of a track in detector i
to detector k, and ~O is the translational offset vector.
The sum is performed over all muon tracks in a single
measurement configuration. The residual S2 was then
minimized with respect to the offset vector using least
squares. Typically, the rotational corrections applied are
on the order of a few milliradians and 1-2 cm, with re-
maining residuals that are less than 0.1 mrad.
With both detectors at the edge of the cask (on the
far left side of Fig. 2), the viewing area is centered on
the 25 cm steel gamma ray shield, and the fuel content
of the cask does not affect the measured scattering. This
provides a calibration data for the measurement as only
the known composition of the cask body itself affects the
muon scattering measured here. Data was collected in
each position for ∼10 days, with samples sizes ranging
from 4×104 to 9×104 muon tracks in each configuration.
Unfortunately, strong winds at the outdoor measurement
site shook the lower detector during the period when one
side of the cask was being measured, which introduced
artifacts into the data that cannot be corrected for with
our track-based alignment procedure. Therefore, we do
not consider the data taken in this position (covering the
rightmost portion of the cask) in our analysis.
III. DATA ANALYSIS AND DISCUSSION
As muons pass through the cask, the amount of scatter-
ing they undergo is dependent on the path lengths of cask
shielding material and fuel encountered along their tra-
jectory. Since the amount of fuel between the detectors
varies moving horizontally across the cask, the scattering
largely depends on the muon’s horizontal starting posi-
tion and azimuthal angle. Given that the fuel assemblies
and body of the cask are approximately homogeneous in
the vertical direction, and the detectors sample a rela-
tively small range in zenith angle (∼ 20◦) , the zenith
angle of the incoming muon has relatively little effect on
the path length sampled, and therefore scattering angle.
We expect muon scattering to be sensitive to changes in
fuel content as we move horizontally across the cask.
Recognizing this, tracks in the upper detector are pro-
jected to the plane centered between the two detectors,
which is divided into voxels with dimensions of 2 cm in
the horizontal direction, 4 cm in the direction between
the two detector, and 1.2 m (the size of the detectors,
i.e. no division) in the vertical direction along the length
of the fuel rods. Each voxel has a corresponding his-
togram. The histogram corresponding to each voxel the
track passes through is filled with the absolute value of
the muon scattering angle, weighted by the path length
the muon traversed through that voxel. Since the precise
muon track within the cask cannot be measured, there is
some uncertainty as to the exact position of the muon at
the center of the cask, so the neighboring voxels are also
filled with the same value. See Fig. 4 for an illustration
of this procedure.
The average value of the scattering angle in each voxel
θ¯scat as a function of the horizontal coordinate across the
cask is shown in Fig. 5, with error bars showing the sta-
tistical uncertainty. The shaded areas represent the lo-
cation of the steel cylindrical gamma shield, and dashed
lines denote the boundaries of columns in the fuel bas-
ket. This metric is related to the number of radiation
lengths the muons traverse while passing from one de-
tector, through the cask, into the other detector, and is
therefore sensitive to the amount of fuel in each column
of the fuel basket.
The solid blue line and dashed red line on Fig. 5 show
θ¯scat from a GEANT4 simulation [49] of muon scattering
in a full and empty cask, respectively. The 107 simulated
muons used in each configuration were generated with an-
gular and momentum distributions described in [29], and
5FIG. 4: An illustration of the analysis procedure (not to
scale). Tracks measured in the elevated upper detector
are projected to an array of voxels at the center of the
cask. Each voxel has a corresponding histogram where
scattering angles of muons which pass through it are
collected.
the simulated detectors were tuned to have an active area
that matched the instrument used for the measurement.
The measured data recorded in each of the nine detec-
tor configurations contains a different amount of muon
tracks due to differences in detector solid angle and the
time spent in each configuration, which introduces a bias
towards the positions with higher counts when combining
the voxel histograms from each position. To account for
this in simulation, the voxel histograms from each indi-
vidual simulated detector configuration were filled with
a weight corresponding to the number of muons recorded
in that configuration in data relative to the entire actual
data set. Additionally, the coincidence requirement be-
tween neighboring tubes that is necessary to reconstruct
muon tracks in the radiation field around the cask am-
plifies the effect of dead tubes in the detector, and intro-
duces non-uniform angular biases in the detector active
area. These are accounted for in simulation by masking
dead areas in the simulated detectors corresponding to
holes in the actual detector acceptance. Thus, while the
cask body is a symmetric object, the simulation reflects
asymmetries in the measured scattering due to detector
acceptance effects and aberration due to different statis-
tical samples in the various detector configurations. The
simulated curves are normalized by a factor of 0.89±0.01
to match the data over the range inside the cask steel
shielding, where contributions from fuel are negligible.
In the leftmost shaded area, a peak is seen due to scat-
tering in the 25 cm steel gamma shielding surrounding
the basket. The precision on features in the first two
basket columns are limited by statistical uncertainties,
but there is evidence for a slight dip in the first column
which contains no fuel as opposed to the two assemblies
that would be present in a full cask. The data here is
consistent with the expectation for an empty cask from
the simulation. The second column shows a small peak
corresponding to the single fuel assembly, and displays an
average scattering magnitude between the expectations
for a full and empty cask, indicating that this column
is partially filled with fuel instead of containing four as-
semblies. The third column in the fuel basket, which is
fully loaded with six bundles, shows a clear peak with an
amplitude that is consistent with the simulation of a full
cask, and is larger than the next two columns containing
five and four bundles, respectively. The fourth column,
which contains only five fuel assemblies instead of the full
six, shows a peak with an amplitude smaller than the ex-
pectation for a fully populated row, which is indicative
of the single missing fuel bundle. The next row, which
is fully loaded with four bundles, displays some disagree-
ment with both the full and empty simulations, although
the limited data on this row precludes strong conclusions
about its fuel content.
As previously discussed, data was recorded on the
rightmost portion of the fuel basket, but during this part
of the measurement the detectors were insufficiently se-
cured against wind at the outdoor testing site. The wind
shook the detectors and therefore introduced artifacts
in the measured scattering angles due to detector move-
ment. Therefore, this data was discarded and no state-
ment can be made about the fuel content of the right-
most column. The problem with detector movement will
be corrected in future measurements with more secure
footing.
For a quantitative comparison, the scattering signal
from Fig. 5 is averaged across the boundaries of each
fuel column for which there is complete data and shown
in Fig. 6, along with the data from the simulations. The
vertical error bars indicate the statistical uncertainty and
the horizontal bars show the range over which the aver-
aging is done for each data point. The simulation of
the full cask shows a maximum scattering at the center
of the cask, where muons pass through the most fuel.
The asymmetries between the sides of the cask with the
same fuel content are due to the non-uniform angular
acceptance of the detectors and the weights that are ap-
plied to each simulated measurement position to accu-
rately reflect the instrument’s active area and measure-
ment times. The empty cask simulation shows minimal
scattering near the center of the cask, where the trajecto-
ries of muons moving from one detector to the other are
nearly perpendicular to the steel gamma shielding and
sample the least path length through this material. On
the edges of the cask, where the path length through the
curving wall of the 25 cm gamma shielding in the cask is
a maximum, the empty cask simulation shows increased
scattering.
We see that the data from the first column, contain-
6FIG. 5: The average muon scattering angle as a
function of horizontal position across the cask. The
gray shaded areas indicate the inner and outer
boundaries of the 25 cm steel shielding around the fuel,
and the boundaries of the columns in the fuel basket are
denoted by dashed lines. A GEANT4 simulation of
muon scattering in a full (empty) cask is shown by the
solid blue (dashed red) line.
FIG. 6: The muon scattering signal, averaged across the
positions of each column in the fuel basket, for data and
simulations of a full and empty cask. The number of
assemblies in each column for the full cask and the
configuration as measured are indicated in text.
ing no fuel, is consistent with expectations for an empty
cask. The second column shows a scattering signal that
is above the expectation for an empty cask, but is lower
than the expected scattering in a full cask by 7σ due to
the three missing bundles in this column. The scatter-
ing in the third column that is fully loaded with fuel is
1.6 σ lower than expectation from a full cask. While this
level of disagreement has limited statistical significance, a
slight deviation from the model of a full cask is expected,
since some muon tracks which are projected here entered
the cask and passed partially through the neighboring
columns, which have less fuel content than the model of
the full cask.
The fourth column, with a single missing bundle, dis-
plays an averaged scattering that is lower than the full
cask model by 2.3σ, which indicates disagreement with
expectations of the full cask at the 98% confidence level.
Most of the relevant data for this column was taken in the
position with both detectors centered on the cask over
a period of 10 days. If additional data were recorded
for one month, the uncertainty would be decreased by
a factor of two, providing much stronger constraints on
the measured fuel content in this column. In an actual
verification scenario, this level of disagreement could be
grounds for requesting additional measurements in this
position, in order to draw stronger conclusions about the
fuel content of this column.
IV. CONCLUSIONS
We have shown that measurements of cosmic ray muon
scattering can be used as a stand-alone method to inde-
pendently determine if fuel assemblies are missing from
a sealed dry storage cask. Unlike more conventional ra-
diographic probes, muons can penetrate the cask shield-
ing and emerge with useful information on the cask con-
tents. Additionally, muons are an external probe that
are not subject to backgrounds from other casks, and
do not require any previous knowledge of the fuel his-
tory. While statistical precision is limited by the natural
flux of cosmic ray muons, count times on the order of
weeks to several months can provide sufficient data to
draw conclusions about cask content. This potentially
solves a long-standing problem in international nuclear
safeguards, using charged particle tracking detectors and
analysis techniques that are commonly found in high-
energy particle physics.
The 1.2 × 1.2 m2 detectors used here are general pur-
pose instruments that were not designed specifically for
cask radiography, and cover a viewing area that is less
than half the cask’s 2.7 m diameter. Due to the limited
flux of cosmic ray muons and the multiple viewing po-
sitions required to survey the entire cask, ∼90 days of
measurement time was required to record the data pre-
sented here. Given that dry storage casks are designed to
have a working lifetime of several decades, during which
they typically sit undisturbed at storage facilities, several
months of measurement time is not expected to pose a
significant impediment to operations at commercial fuel
storage sites. This measurement time also satisfies the
IAEA’s timeliness goal for detecting the diversion of ir-
radiated direct use material (such as plutonium in spent
fuel) of 3 months [50]. However, an instrument which can
7cover more of the cask with a more efficient gamma re-
jection trigger can reduce count times by a factor of ∼4,
and would allow multiple casks to be inspected at a site
while still satisfying IAEA timeliness goals. A dedicated
instrument can also be further hardened against the en-
vironmental conditions (wind and precipitation) that are
typically encountered at outdoor spent fuel storage in-
stallations. Further work to understand the sensitivity
of muon radiography to more complicated potential di-
version scenarios (such as the removal of a portion of a
single assembly, or replacement of a spent fuel assembly
with a dummy assembly made of different material) is
underway.
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